AbstrAct
the pathophysiology of cardiac arrest improved, the procedures to resuscitate or re-animate expanded to include mouth-to-mouth inflation of the lungs and cardiac compression, not only closed, but also even direct squeezing of the heart in an opened chest. (1) Early resuscitation raised little ethical concern. Drowning victims were often youths without underlying pathology and attempts to prolong life were presumed to be desirable and appropriate. As resuscitation techniques improved its application expanded to potentially include anyone suffering cardiac arrest -raising the risk that patients might be resuscitated despite painful irreversible conditions likely to cause imminent death regardless. Resuscitation's indications became less clear, both to patients' families and their physicians. Social, ethical, and legal problems consequently developed, and this paper discusses an appropriate framework for decision-making algorithms for resuscitation.
PErmIssIon to trEAt
In the English legal tradition offensive contact is considered battery unless the ostensible victim consents. (2) Even non-controversial interventions such as an appendectomy to remedy acute appendicitis have side-effects which offensiveness to the patient would invite legal treatment as battery, absent effective consent. A patient who is awake and able to consider a treatment's risks and benefits -the case for most care-seeking patients -presents a straightforward opportunity to accomplish the ethically crucial task of obtaining effective consent. However, a patient able to give consent, who on learning about available options refuses proposed treatments, has the privilege to avoid the proposed offensive contact. Even in this world of uncertain outcomes, an optimal course of treatment may be ascertainable for a patient. Yet, the mass-casualty environment of modern medical institutions makes it possible that dedicating resources to provide optimal treatment for some may jeopardise an institution's outcomes for other patients. (8) The capacity to benefit is a significant factor in evaluating the ethics of allocating resources among existing and potential patients. (9) Futility represents one extreme range of capacity to benefit and provides a useful place to consider resolution of resource allocation conflict.
While we must strive to offer the best possible care to every patient, our recommended interventions must remain flexible, and vary not only with patients' predicted outcomes but with the available resources at the time and place of treatment. The certainty with which physicians recommend an intervention must relate to the likelihood of the outcome. Because outcomes are uncertain, recommendations should overwhelmingly be made with the understanding that risks are ultimately borne by the patient.
It is imperative that full information on recommended alternatives be provided. There is a cost in time and training to enabling patients' informed consent, but failure to meet this standard departs from society's expectations, thus necessitating this outlay.
Failure to keep decision-makers adequately informed undermines the principle of patient self-determination and individual autonomy.
Purported consent obtained by limiting the options and risks disclosed to decision-makers is not informed consent, and is merely illusory.
mEdIcAl uncErtAInty And thE dEcIsIon contrIbutIon chArt
Medical probability lies within trained professionals' expertise, but weighing risks and the value of outcomes is the realm in Exacerbating the difficulty of analysing disputes over resuscitation is the imprecise terminology framing the disputes. Futility is typically asserted as an absolute. In reality a treatment can only be termed futile once intervention was given in full measure until the patient was so obviously beyond help that further resuscitation was agreed to be wasteful by all witnesses and that continued intervention was considered to have no desirable effect. To so demonstrate contribution of the medical team is zero. This does not mean the medical team did not provide information to the patient or the patient's decision-makers, but that the physician's role is informative and not persuasive. If there is no basis on which to advocate any particular therapy, there is every reason to solicit the patient's most informed decision in selecting treatment. Uninformed consent is contrary to the patient self-determination, so the need to provide accurate information regarding the choices is very high despite the possible equivalence of the treatments.
How to value risks and uncertainties is not plainly established in the ethics literature. The correct and ethical result that should be reached at the extremes -deadlocked independent experts or absolute unanimity -seem clear in the light of competing interests, but such circumstances may not characterise many disputed medical decisions. As one drifts from the clear poles of certainty, the weighing of competing outcomes' value to particular patients may drive decision-making into the hands of patients in a nonlinear fashion. fIGurE 2: the decision triangle makes the assumption that the decision-making process is linear; yet, as appropriateness of alternatives becomes subject to judgements regarding the value of outcomes and the significance of probabilities, the ethical principle of patient self-determination requires great deference to be accorded the preferences of the patient. Accordingly, the sinusoidal pattern reflects an improved algorithm which reflecs the distribution of decisions among the stakeholders, more quickly accelerating to patient advocates the fractional contribution to medical decisions as a case's prospects diverge from apparent medical certainty. see text. futility is undesirable. Futility analysis is also complicated by the rare cases in which recovery occurs despite physicians' conviction of irreversibility. The limit of medical knowledge prevents knowing, with absolute certainty, that continued treatment of a live patient will be futile. (11) The principle of personal sovereignty prevents a system in which patients, once delivered into the hands of medical professionals, must accept whatever care the physicians choose to provide. The fact that every patient is different, and that patients have legitimately different interests and personal priorities, makes it impossible to dictate in advance the proper care for every diagnosis.
Yet, patients cannot be permitted to demand any treatment regardless of potential benefit or resource limitations. All stakeholders need an established mechanism by which conflicts regarding appropriate care can be resolved without necessarily invoking a judicial system whose expense and adversarial nature work against the interests of all parties. 
InvokInG futIlIty PolIcIEs
Announcing reliance on a statute protecting withdrawal of treatment is not the ideal mechanism through which a treatment team informs a patient's family that the end is near. The broader relationship of an institution to its stakeholders militates against reliance on futility policies when alternatives exist. 
